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Abstract— Generally wireless sensor networks rely of many-
to-one communication approach for data gathering. This 
approach is extremely susceptible to sinkhole attack, where an 
intruder attracts surrounding nodes with unfaithful routing 
information, and subsequently presents selective forwarding or 
change the data that carry through it. A sinkhole attack causes 
an important threat to sensor networks and it should be 
considered that the sensor nodes are mostly spread out in open 
areas and of weak computation and battery power. In order to 
detect the intruder in a sinkhole attack this paper suggests an 
algorithm which firstly finds a group of suspected nodes by 
analyzing the consistency of data. Then, the intruder is 
recognized efficiently in the group by checking the network ﬂow 
information. The proposed algorithm’s performance has been 
evaluated by using numerical analysis and simulations. 
Therefore, accuracy and efficiency of algorithm would be 
verified.  
Keywords— Wireless Sensor Networks, Sinkhole Attack, 
Intruder Detection, security in wireless sensor networks, Detection 
of sinkhole attack. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have grown in 
importance as a low-cost solution for data measurement and 
collection.  A key advantage of WSNs is their ease of 
deployment, in part due to their use of routing protocols that 
self-configure the network [1, 2].  However, if WSNs are to be 
used to monitor critical infrastructure, such as water 
distribution, then it is essential that the integrity of the WSN be 
protected against malicious attacks.  In particular, the routing 
protocols used with WSNs are potentially vulnerable to routing 
attacks, which can disrupt connectivity in the network.  While 
traditional cryptographic defenses are used to protect wired 
networks, the limited communication and Central processing 
unit resources in low-cost wireless sensor nodes makes 
resource intensive cryptography impractical.   
Sinkhole attacks (see Fig. 1) typically work by making a 
compromised node look especially attractive to surrounding 
nodes with respect to the routing algorithm. For instance, an 
adversary could spoof or replay an advertisement for an 
extremely high quality route to a BS. Some protocols might 
actually try to verify the quality of route with end-to-end 
acknowledgements containing reliability or latency 
information. In this case, a laptop-class adversary with a 
powerful transmitter can actually provide a high quality route 
by transmitting with enough power to reach the BS in a single 
hop, or by using a wormhole attack.  
 
Figure 1: Sinkhole Attack 
 
Due to either the real or imagined high quality route 
through the compromised node, it is likely each neighboring 
node of the adversary will forward packets destined for a BS 
through the adversary, and also propagate the attractiveness of 
the route to its neighbors. Effectively, the adversary creates a 
large “sphere of influence”, attracting all traffics destined for a 
BS from nodes several hops away from the compromised node.  
The base station is prevented by the sinkhole attack from 
achieving complete and accurate sensing data, and therefore it 
is resulted in an important threat which is critical for wireless 
sensor networks. In fact, this happens due to the unprotected 
wireless links, the deployment of the sensors in open areas, and 
the weak computation and battery power.  
The current routing protocols in sensor networks show 
usually vulnerability to the sinkhole attack [1]. Some studies 
have suggested several secure mechanisms to use as 
cryptographic methods for protecting network however, they 
are mostly localized, or there is a high computation and also a 
requirement for time synchronization among the nodes. We 
present a new lightweight algorithm in order to detect the 
sinkhole attack and to recognize the engaged intruder [3, 9].  
This paper considers a usual many-to-one communication 
where the routes are set up based on the receiving of route 
advertisements. The suggested method can investigate the 
asymmetricity between the sensor nodes and the base station.  
This solution causes also effective application of the relatively-
high computation and communication power of the base station 
[4, 7]. 
Two main parts can be explained for this technique; a 
secure and low-overhead algorithm and an eﬃcient 
identiﬁcation algorithm. The first one is a protected and low-
overhead algorithm for the base station which can collect the 
network ﬂow information from the attacked area. The second 
one is an algorithm able to analyze the routing pattern and 
identify the intruder.  
This paper also focuses on the complex scenario with 
colluding nodes that can as a group, deceive the base station 
about the location of intruder. Particularly, multiple suspected 
nodes are checked and the intruder is recognized with a voting 
method. 
It is demonstrated that the suggested algorithm is accurate 
as long as the normal nodes are main. Simulations are used to 
evaluate the performance of the presented algorithm, and the 
eﬀectiveness and accuracy of the algorithm are verified. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
      One of the important topics in the Internet evolution 
research is intrusion detection [6]. In addition, several studies 
have suggested various detection algorithms for wireless ad 
hoc networks. It is supposed that there are uniform nodes and 
symmetric data communication patterns among the nodes [7, 
8]. However, there are various problems specifically the 
sinkhole attack for one-to-many communication pattern in 
wireless sensor networks. And this problem is being harmful 
due to the feeble computation and battery power of the sensor 
nodes. Although Karlof used a trust scheme to the routing 
protocol for detection of sinkhole and wormhole attacks in a 
sensor network, however activity of nodes in a promiscuous 
mode is essential. It has been shown that packet leash can 
confide the maximum transmission time and distance of each 
packet [8].  It is suggested that a key can be acquired by a node 
for any other node and each data packet can use authentication.  
     Ngai et al. [1] firstly has suggested a method for detection 
of sinkhole attacks which includes the BS in the detection 
process, causing an elevated communication cost for the 
protocol. The network is flooded by the BS with a request 
message including the IDs of the influenced nodes.   The 
affected nodes reply to the BS with a message containing their 
IDs, ID of the next hop and the associated cost. The received 
information is then used from the BS to construct a network 
flow graph for identifying the sinkhole.  Other existing 
protocols build detecting mechanisms for sinkhole attacks in 
sensor networks that are based on routing protocols usually 
deployed in Ad-Hoc networks, like the Ad Hoc On-demand 
Distance Vector Protocol (AODV) [6] and the Dynamic Source 
Routing (DSR) Protocol [8]. In our experience, the routing 
protocols are specifically designed for sensor networks, like 
MintRoute and MultiHopLQI, require much less resources and 
are usually preferred for such networks.  
      As mentioned earlier, this commonly used many-to-one 
communication pattern is vulnerable to sinkhole attacks. In this 
type of attack, an intruder usually attracts network traﬃc by 
advertising itself as having the shortest path to the base station. 
For example, as shown in Fig. 1a, an intruder, which is 
equipped with much higher computation and communication 
power than a normal sensor node, creates a high-quality single-
hop link to the BS. It can then advertise imitated routing 
messages about the high quality route, spooﬁng the 
surrounding nodes to create a sinkhole (SH). A sinkhole can 
also be performed using a wormhole, which creates a 
metaphorical sinkhole with the intruder being the center; the 
intruder then relays the messages received in one part of the 
network toward the sink using a tunnel (see Fig. 2b). 
 
 
Figure 2: (a) Using an artiﬁcial high quality route; (b) using a 
wormhole. 
III. ASSUMPTION AND NETWORK MODEL 
In a wireless sensor network, multiple nodes would send 
sensor readings to a BS for further processing. It is known that 
such a many-to-one communication is highly vulnerable to a 
sinkhole attack, where an intruder attracts surrounding nodes 
with unfaithful routing information, and then performs 
selective forwarding or alters the data passing through it [5]. A 
sinkhole attack forms a serious threat to sensor networks, 
particularly considering that the sensor nodes are often 
deployed in open areas and of weak computation and battery 
power. Although some secure or geographic based routing 
protocols resist to the sinkhole attacks in certain level, many 
current routing protocols in sensor networks are susceptible to 
the sinkhole attack. 
It is supposed that the sensor nodes are either normal or 
malicious. The sinkhole attack center is a malicious node 
which is compromised by the intruder. It should be noticed that 
if there is only one compromised node, many surrounding 
normal nodes can be affected by this one compromised node 
via making a high quality route to the base station. In addition, 
this intruder can also collude with some other malicious nodes. 
They are able to even cooperatively deceive the detection 
algorithm by proposing a normal node as the intruder. 
IV. SINKHOLE ATTACK DETECTION  
     In this section, we show how find a sinkhole attack in 
wireless sensor network, and after that how identify the 
intruder in area. The purpose of adversary in a sinkhole attack 
is to tempt almost all the traffic from a special network by way 
of a compromised node, making a metaphorical sinkhole with 
the adversary at the base station. Normally, by making a 
compromised node which appeared to be particularly 
interesting to encircling nodes concerning the routing 
algorithm, sinkhole attacks can act.  Since of difficulty to 
confirm routing information which provided by a node, 
sinkhole attacks are difficult to counter.  For instance, laptop 
class adversary has a great power radio transmitter. This 
permits laptop-class adversary to supply a high-quality route by 
transmitting with adequate power to obtain a broad area of the 
network. 
     At the first, we focus on single malicious node and then 
enhance it to find multiple malicious nodes in next section. So, 
the algorithm ﬁrst ﬁnds a list of suspected nodes through 
checking data consistency, and then eﬀectively identiﬁes the 
intruder in the list through analyzing the network ﬂow 
information. The algorithm is also robust to deal with multiple 
malicious nodes that cooperatively hide the real intruder. 
a) Estimate the attacked area: Firstly to gather the 
network ﬂow information from the attacked area, a safe and 
low-overhead algorithm for the base station is used and in the 
second, to investigate the routing pattern and positions the 
intruder an effective identiﬁcation algorithm is employed.  The 
complicated story with cheating nodes which collectively 
deceive the destination about the invader condition is regarded 
too.  We continue two methods to find an intruder in sinkhole 
attack.   
        First of all, by calculating the area of attack the network is 
arranged into several under-domains and information within 
every of them are compared.  The attack also can be discovered 
through the detection of the changeable data among the typical 
sensors and assault nodes in the under-domains.   Moreover to 
explore the losing data of the attacked sensor and to recognize 
the area of attack it can be used.  An intruder cannot change the 
data starting in all the nodes in the network due to the size 
limitation of the attacked area. 
     For demonstrate, perceive a supervision application in from 
what sensor nodes give in data to the base station frequently. 
Let X1 , X2 … Xn  and Y1 , Y2 ... Yn  and ∂1 , ∂2 …∂n be the 
sensing data collected. 
 
 
 
        Therefore, in some of the sub-areas the attack has to be 
found.  Following the recognition of a group of suspicious 
nodes, the location of sinkhole can be calculated by using the 
BS.  Particularly, an ability attacked area that includes any 
suspicious nodes can be encircled.  Second, the area of attack 
can include lots of nodes, and in a multi-hop sensor network 
the sinkhole is not inevitably the center of the area, also it is 
not essential to more identify the accurate intruder and isolate 
it from the network.  For finding the intruder: It is attainable 
by examining the routing model in the influenced domain.   
So, a technique which gathers the network into data to make 
easier the routing model examination is shown (Fig.3).   
 
 
BS                        Base station                    
SH                        Sinkhole attack 
 
Table 1: Abbreviations  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Estimate the attacked area 
b) Identify by intruder: The message has within the 
identity of the influenced nodes.  At the beginning, a request 
message goes into the BS.  The message has IDs of the 
influenced nodes which flooding hop by hop.   Since there is 
every node‘s ID, the request is accepted by all nodes and they 
should reply the BS by messages that contain their own ID; 
the next-hop node. Note that the next-hop and the cost could 
already.  Pay attention for the attack which could influence the 
next-hop and the cost previously.  So, the reply message 
should be transferred through the reverse path in the ﬂooding, 
which relates to the original route without intruding.    
 
 
 
Figure 4: Network into the attack area 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
The performance of suggested sinkhole detection 
algorithm is further evaluated by simulating a wireless sensor 
network with a 150 meter by 150 meter ﬁeld in which 200 
nodes are placed with uniform random distribution.  The 
sensors adopt IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol with of 5 meter. In 
order to collect data from the sensors a base station is placed 
at the center of the network.  Furthermore, a sinkhole attack a 
sinkhole is added to the network at x- and y-coordinates (50, 
50) in order to emulate. It is important to evaluate the 
accuracy on intruder identiﬁcation.   
 
Number of nodes                                               200 
Number of sinkhole                                                            1 
Message drop rate (d)                                                         0.8                
Packet size                                                                          500 
Traffic Type                                                                        GBR 
Location of sinkhole                                                           (35, 35) 
Location of BS                                                                    (80, 80) 
Transmission range                                                             100m 
Protocol                                                                               AODV 
Malicious node                                                                    1 
Movement Model                                                                Random Way point 
 
Table 2: Parametrs for simulation 
a) accuracy of intruder identification: The accuracy of 
suggested intruder detection algorithm for sinkhole attacks is 
investigated in the ﬁrst set of experiments and three measures 
are considered including; (1) success rate, which shows the 
ability of the presented algorithm to properly recognize the SH 
in percentage; (2) false-positive rate, which shows the ability 
of suggested algorithm to incorrectly identify the SH; and (3) 
false-negative rate, which shows the inability of algorithm in 
identification of intruder which is in fact exist.  
      Figure 5 shows the success rate of intruder identification. 
The figure show that algorithm work in best situation when m 
is less than 50% of colluding nodes in dropping rate = 0.8. 
When dropping rate increase we can see that dropping rate 
drop. This means we have some missing data in networks.  
     Figure 6 and 7 show the false positive rate and false 
negative rate of colluding nodes. When the false negative 
increase in the networks we can see our algorithm works well 
but in false positive rate is reverse. When the colluding nodes 
increase the false positive increase slightly to reach 23 of false 
positive rate.  
     According to above results, it is show that our algorithm 
can effective related the previous works [1, 2, and 5] in 
m=50%. In the Success rate in intruder identification, our 
algorithm detect the intruder in highest rate in 50% of 
colluding nodes, but the accuracy is 79% in end; however, the 
rate of colluding nodes in [2] is a bit less than new results.  
The similar results are show in Figure 6 and 7. This show that 
our result is effective relative previous works in m=50% of 
colluding nodes.   
 
Figure 5: Success rate in intruder identification 
 
 
Figure 6: False negative rate in intruder identification 
 
Figure 7: False positive rate in intruder identification 
VI. CONLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
        This study suggested a worthwhile technique to identify 
sinkhole attack in a wireless sensor network and the algorithm 
is composed of two steps. At the first the algorithm locates a 
list of suspected nodes by testing consistency of data. Then the 
intruder in the list is recognized via analyzing the network flow 
information. Moreover, the study has investigated the 
algorithm performance via numerical analysis and simulations. 
As a result, the effectiveness and accuracy of the algorithm 
have been demonstrated at the result in last section. This study 
can be further improved specifically in greater effective 
statistical algorithms to recognize inconsistency of data. 
Therefore they can correctly locate suspected nodes in sinkhole 
attacks and can identify communication and computation 
overhead. 
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